Finding 02: the 2023 recruitment gap is a notable point
For the 12 months ending 30 June 2023, the published headline numbers were 10,470 joining and 16,460 leaving. The rounded figures imply a gap of −5,990. The written MoD commentary describes −5,960. This period had the highest total outflow among the seven year-end windows in this particular series, at 16,460 people.
Those statistics describe movements of UK Regulars, not the number of applications rejected, entrants failing selection or medically unfit applicants. The gap can widen because recruiting slows, departures increase, or both. Comparing year-end counts identifies trends without proving what caused them.
Finding 03: voluntary outflow measures something narrower than all leavers
Some personnel leave because an agreed engagement ends, for medical or disciplinary reasons, or for other reasons. The official Voluntary Outflow indicator records relevant trained Navy/RAF and trade-trained Army personnel who voluntarily exit before the end of their agreed engagement or commission. The VO rate divides those exits by the corresponding average trained/trade-trained strength for the period.
For the 12 months ending June 2023 the published tri-service rate was 6.5%. It was 4.8% in the twelve months ending June 2026. Both are observations; the difference is not proof that a single housing, pay or recruitment reform caused improved retention. The minimum rate in our seven chosen windows was 3.8% in 2021.
Finding 04: the services have different voluntary-outflow rates
For the 2026 window, the MOD reports trained/trade-trained voluntary-outflow rates of 5.0% for Army, 4.7% for Royal Navy/Marines, and 4.2% for RAF. These rates are not standardised individual probabilities; they also do not compare identical jobs or rank composition across services.
| Year | Army rate | Navy/Marines rate | RAF rate |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 5.9% | 4.8% | 4.8% |
| 2021 | 3.9% | 4.0% | 3.6% |
| 2022 | 5.3% | 5.3% | 4.4% |
| 2023 | 6.4% | 6.5% | 6.8% |
| 2024 | 6.8% | 5.9% | 5.9% |
| 2025 | 6.1% | 5.4% | 4.6% |
| 2026 | 5.0% | 4.7% | 4.2% |
What not to conclude from this research
Do not divide an Army application count by total tri-service intake to infer a chance of joining. Application statistics have varying definitions and reporting dates and may represent multiple applications rather than one person. Do not assume all outflow is voluntary or that a year with positive net flow has solved a trained-staffing shortfall. Learn the distinctions in our recruitment statistics methodology guide.
Financial-year and calendar-year statistics have different coverage from the July-ended 12-month windows used here. We have not combined them. Similarly, yearly average Regular personnel is not a recruitment-flow measure, and an instantaneous July headcount is not an admission rate.
Potential reasons for departures are not proof of causality
The MOD points readers towards the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey for personnel attitudes, including family life, career opportunities and other pressures. Survey respondents and all exiting personnel are not interchangeable populations. A defensible research project would separately assess sample methodology, response bias, rank mix and timing before attributing a trend to a specific cause.
For complete records and rounded discrepancies, download the published source register. This project is independently compiled and not affiliated with the MOD. Latest statistical reporting in our archive is the July 2026 edition, not a live force-management database.